Belarusians’ bad dream: Populism

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Is populism in Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe the same thing?

To quote this document: Belarus Project, “Belarusians’ bad dream: Populism ”, Nouvelle Europe [en ligne], Monday 9 January 2012, http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/node/1393, displayed on 17 May 2012

(written by Artom Pugachev and Marta Palombo - Belarus Project)

After the fall of the Soviet Union, populism emerged in the Belarusian political context as an effective instrument to come to power and to retain it. A democratically elected president, Alexander Lukashenko, has been governing since 1994; his unique leadership style continuously attracts the attention of the international community, not least because of its populist character.

Receptive grounds

Russians like repeating “A spoon is good for lunch”, meaning everything is to be used in its own time and in the right context; so it is with populism. The social, political and economic environment in Belarus in the early nineties presented a very receptive ground for populist influences. The fall of the Soviet Union brought an objective need for change in leadership; but commonly inherited political “ignorance” from the recent Soviet past, combined with the impact of external conditions, almost pre-determined the outcome.

The fall of the Soviet Union, firstly, opened the door for a change in leadership. Belarus, dominated by the Russian Empire since 1795 and under the Soviet Union since 1922, found itself suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, in front of an open future. Although this situation was viewed and presented as a great chance by Western observers, Belarusian citizens were overwhelmed by an unfamiliar feeling of uncertainty. Residents of the former BSSR, who had spent decades living in a rigid but stable political system with very limited personal freedoms, were now for the first time asked to select their new leader.

The civil society was not ready to meet this challenge. Non-governmental institutions were underdeveloped and a bunch of existing political parties were still too weak. Furthermore, there was barely any political agenda that could unite the fragmented Belarusian society. In the Baltic countries and some other republics of former Soviet states, the appeal to national identity and unity, skilfully used by national elites, was able to bring the societies together. However, it could not work in Belarus, which was by far the most russified of USSR states and historically had to put itself up with a low sense of national identity. Last but not least, this change took place at a time when the political conscience of the civil society was still in its cradle, having had no chance of being nurtured during Belarusian communistic and subdued past.

The combination of worries for political instability and immature political conscience was worsened by the influence of other “environmental” conditions. Since 1988 population had lived in an economic situation that worsened every year. The product deficit of the 1980s turned into full-scale economic collapse starting from 1992, with rising unemployment and high inflation rates, bringing impoverishment and desperation. The fear was strengthened by the example of transition to democracy in neighbouring countries. Russia’s brand new “wild capitalism” and privatisation, which was aptly dubbed “prikhvatisation” (a Russian colloquial word meaning “stealing”) became a nightmare for many Belarusians, who were afraid of the same happening to them.

The fear of the post-communist injustice and poverty was thoroughly used by populist movements. In his early speeches Lukashenko often emphasized the necessity for change to a democratic and fair society. He promised a smooth transition to a market economy and intended to deal harshly with all types of corruption and “prikhvatisers”. The latter title was the legal ground to dismiss other candidates in his first race for presidency. Thanks to the favourable conditions described above, populism helped him to successfully secure the highest position in the young republic.

The vicious circle of populist influence

The populist appeal of Lukashenko may arguably be considered one of the main building blocks for his prolonged stay in power in Belarus. The successful formula for his appeal seems to have three ingredients. Firstly, Lukashenko effectively creates a feeling of proximity between the leader and the people through his charismatic and unsophisticated leadership style. Secondly, he understands the mood of the masses and accordingly shapes his communication, highlighting the successes and deemphasizing the failures. Thirdly, he has successfully adopted an image of defender of the common people, which he continues to nurture and make use of. Thanks to these populist techniques, Lukashenko has managed to avoid mass discontent and to stay in power.

Lukashenko’s populism can be traced in the charismatic and simple character of his leadership. As stressed out by Matsuzato Kimitaka, the stability of Lukashenko’s power confirms the originality of a monopolistic populist regime based on the model of “the leader and the people”, without any intra-elite competitions, as observed instead in Ukraine and Kazakhstan and other post-soviet countries.

Here Lukashenko’s image of being one of the common people is particularly useful. Official media portray him as a pragmatic, work-loving man, by showing him in the field during agricultural campaigns, at production plants or in villages. The hero-like masculinity of his presence in the media was particularly evident after the bomb explosions in 2005 and 2010. In both cases he was shown being in charge of rescue operations within minutes after the tragedies happened.

All his public speeches with no exception are rich of colloquial rhetoric, which is being mocked by the opposition, but nonetheless strikes accords with the masses. His discourse often enhances “the uniqueness, unity and sovereignty” of Belarus, revealing his organic view of the political community. There is a recurrent marginalisation of the members of the opposition, presented as traitors and strongly tracked. Lukashenko is depicted as a messianic leader striving for social harmonization, which justifies the concentration of economic resources in his hands. These resources can subsequently be distributed in order both to demonstrate the power of the president and to obtain support from those who benefit from them.