Does the Turkish Stream Fuel the “Anti-Visegrad Alliance”?

By Andreas Pacher | 3 October 2016

Russia and Turkey agreed to build the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline in August 2016. This is beneficial for Bulgaria’s and Greece’s ambitions to become regional gas hubs, even more so when potential supplies of LNG, shale gas, and natural gas from Azerbaijan are taken into account. Despite the V4’s contrasting stakes in energy policy (which does not want to “lose” Ukraine), talks about an Graeco-Bulgarian "Anti-Visegrad Alliance" are exaggerated. 

Constructions from the South Caucasus: Pipelines and Khachkars

By Andreas Pacher | 3 October 2016

In the Visegrad countries, traditional Armenian cross-stones (or khachkars) are silently countering Azerbaijan’s major role as a future gas provider to the EU. The diaspora-funded activities often obtain local governments' support for their seemingly unharmful nature. However, the khachkars have the potential to subtly and enduringly change the public’s perceptions in the V4, whose governments are seen as crucial drivers behind the EU’s Eastern Partnership.

The Visegrad Group’s development assistance to Eastern Partnership countries

By Balázs Gyimesi | 2 October 2016

The Visegrad countries’ total ODA flows have increased impressively between 2007 and 2014, the main recipients of which are those EaP states which directly border the EU, especially Ukraine. The Visegrad Group’s joint aid programme focusing on the EaP countries - the “Visegrad 4 Eastern Partnership” - funds specific projects related to the development of civil society in the EaP states. A strengthening of the common Visegrad framework for the coordination of development assistance efforts would be possible in order to channel development assistance in a more efficient and integrated manner.

Between East and West: The Hungarian Minority in Ukraine

By Inga Chelyadina | 2 October 2016

Though the Hungarian minority in the West of Ukraine is not the largest one in the country, it could still play a crucial role during the current crisis in Ukraine. The minority’s quests could become an asset for Russia. The far-right Jobbik (the third largest party in Hungary financed by Russia) has already shown its will to get Ukrainian Transcarpathia back. This ambition is highly unrealistic; nevertheless, it could, in theory, lead to more separatist discourses, which would weaken the country even more.

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